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Legal Reform in the Xi Jinping Era
Carl Minzner
I n the fall of 2014, Chinese Communist Party authorities made legal reform the focus of their annual plenum for the first time. The Fourth 
Plenum Decision confirmed a shift away from some of the policies of the late 
Hu Jintao era, but liberal reforms still remain off the table. The top-down 
vision of legal reform developing under Xi Jinping’s administration 
may have more in common with current trends in the party disciplinary 
apparatus or historical ones in the imperial Chinese censorate than it does 
with Western rule-of-law norms.
This essay attempts to do three things: (1) analyze how and why China’s 
legal reforms have shifted over the past two decades, (2) outline the direction 
of reform under Xi, and (3) sketch out the institutional considerations that 
are likely to steer state efforts in the legal field over the coming years.
The Turn Against Law
In the first decade of the 21st century, Chinese Communist Party 
authorities turned against many of the legal reform efforts that they 
themselves had launched in the 1980s and 1990s. Starting around 2005, 
a new official line began to gradually penetrate China’s judicial and legal 
organs. Broadly speaking, this position included the following:
• A shift away from late 20th-century efforts to promote judicial 
professionalism, coupled with a revival of 1950s Maoist-era ideals of 
judicial populism
• A revived focus on mediation, rather than court trials, as a preferred 
mechanism for resolving conflicts among citizens as well as between 
citizens and the state
• A new state narrative depicting the law as cold and unresponsive to 
citizen needs
• A stress on the courts as an undifferentiated cog within the state 
organs for stability maintenance (weiwen)
• A steady reduction in tolerance for the activities of public interest 
(weiquan) lawyers
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• A new political campaign reiterating party supremacy over the 
constitution, law, and courts
• The charging of local officials with the priority task of containing 
citizen disputes, conflicts, and petitions at all costs
Central authorities employed multiple tools to implement these shifts. 
Some were highly public—for example, the 2008 appointment of a veteran 
security apparatchik as the new head of the Supreme People’s Court, the 
2009 police raid on the Open Constitution Initiative, and the subsequent 
repression of public interest lawyers such as Xu Zhiyong and Teng Biao. 
Other tools were less visible. New propaganda campaigns within the courts 
presented changed depictions of “model” judges to emulate: tireless court 
officials perhaps lacking in book learning but at ease among the masses, 
recognizant of parties’ emotions, and able to resolve disputes (often without 
resort to legal norms) before they blossomed into conflict. Personnel 
evaluation systems for judges and other officials were tweaked to emphasize 
mediation rather than adjudication. 
In part, this shift was a politicized counter-reaction to the results of 
earlier reforms. Late 20th-century Chinese authorities had emphasized 
the role of law, litigation, and court mechanisms for resolving civil and 
administrative disputes. By the early 21st century, these practices had given 
rise to a range of actors within both state and society pushing for deeper 
institutional change. The early 2000s had seen activists such as Xu and Teng 
fuse court challenges with savvy use of the media to put heavy pressure on 
both central and local authorities. Within the bureaucracy itself, new voices 
were beginning to suggest that the law and constitution should be assigned a 
greater role in governing official actions. The new official line that descended 
on the legal system in the first decade of the 21st century sought to defang 
some of these pressures.
Central authorities were also motivated by deep concerns over social 
unrest. They saw legal reforms channeling disputes into an institutionally 
weak judiciary lacking the capacity to enforce its own verdicts. They noted 
with unease a rising tide of citizen petitioners invoking the language of 
law and rights—not always with merit—to mount increasingly organized 
challenges to the actions of local officials. And they voiced concerns that 
a rising cadre of academically trained young judges preferred to sit behind 
their desks and write opinions on technical legal issues rather than, for 
example, camp out in muddy fields and engage in tough negotiations to 
head off imminent mass protests by villagers aggrieved by land seizures 
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for development projects. Faced with such concerns, revival of Maoist-era 
populist judging techniques, coupled with a political crackdown in the legal 
system, made eminent sense to China’s leaders.
Legal Reform, Xi-Style
Now Beijing has changed course yet again. Since 2012, many—but 
not all—of the above elements have been abandoned in central policy 
statements. This shift is broadly reflected in the 2014 Central Committee 
plenum decision. It is also expressed in a range of detailed implementation 
measures that party officials have issued in recent months. In part, the new 
official line consists of the following elements:
• Assertions of legal and judicial reform as a central priority of Xi’s 
administration
• Attempts to centralize control over the judicial system and limit the 
influence of local officials
• A return to concepts of judicial professionalism
• Efforts to steer citizen disputes back to the courts
• Revived emphasis on adjudication and trials as the center of court work
• A renewed focus on the distinctions between the roles of judges and 
other state employees
Central authorities have relied on a range of mechanisms to push 
these changes. Legal technocrats have once again been placed in charge 
of China’s courts—most notably with the appointment in 2013 of Zhou 
Qiang as China’s top judge, the president of the Supreme People’s Court. 
The current model judge campaign within China’s courts now extols a set 
of values that differ dramatically from those emphasized five years ago. The 
campaign surrounds the recently deceased vice president of the Shanghai 
High People’s Court and touts his educational credentials, academic 
publications, professional demeanor, trial experience, and expertise at 
creating PowerPoint presentations. Authorities are also attempting to alter 
judicial personnel systems by instructing courts to clean up “unreasonable” 
performance targets used to evaluate judges.
Additionally, Chinese officials are seeking to centralize control over 
the judiciary and insulate judges from local influences. In 2013, China 
launched experimental reforms in six provinces aimed at removing control 
over court personnel and funding from the hands of local governments 
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and vesting it instead with provincial authorities. Further moves have 
followed in the wake of the 2014 Fourth Plenum Decision. The creation 
of cross-jurisdictional local courts and procuratorates seeks to cut across 
existing administrative lines of authority and curb the influence of local 
officials. The establishment of circuit tribunals of the Supreme People’s 
Court in regional centers (Shenzhen and Shenyang being the first two) aims 
to extend the court’s reach and better coordinate the exercise of judicial 
power in cross-provincial cases. And building on language in the Decision, 
party officials have ordered local government authorities not to interfere 
with ongoing court cases, while judges have been instructed to keep records 
of any violations. Naturally, this is not aimed at disturbing the underlying 
principle of one-party rule. Party political-legal committees remain intact, 
and courts are still expected to follow their guidance. 
Thus, much remains unchanged. Social stability continues to be a 
paramount concern. Party disciplinary authorities, rather than legal organs, 
have taken the lead in the massive anticorruption campaign that Xi has 
launched to shake up the bureaucracy and topple his rivals. Repressive 
policies launched over the past decade have not weakened, and in some cases 
they are strengthening. Beijing has, for example, intensified the crackdown 
on public-interest lawyers. A new draft law is poised to both curtail the 
operations of foreign NGOs in China and severely restrict the funding of 
domestic Chinese organizations and legal activists. Academic discourse in 
the field of constitutional law has been curtailed, and authorities appear 
to be moving toward a broader repoliticization of higher education amid 
new calls for China to resist the infiltration of foreign ideas and pay more 
attention to its own cultural and historical roots.
Back to the Past?
China’s current trajectory is not simply a replay of the 1990s and early 
2000s, when the field of legal reform was a strategic gray zone. Then, centrally 
driven top-down reforms (such as moves to increase the educational level 
of judges) coexisted with a wide range of experimental reforms by local 
officials, as well as with bottom-up pressures from activists seeking to 
employ the language of legal reform to advance their own interests.
That space has now contracted for two reasons. First, since the early 
2000s, state authorities have become much less tolerant of broader social 
activism in the legal arena. Second, the fact that central party authorities 
under Xi Jinping have put forward their own comprehensive agenda for 
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legal reform has curtailed the willingness of local authorities to go out on a 
limb and experiment. When central mandates regarding the law remained 
relatively vague, as with the broad invocation of yifa zhiguo (rule according 
to law) in the late 1990s, room existed for local officials and citizen activists to 
interpret exactly what that should mean in practice. Now central authorities 
have begun to reduce these mandates to a more concrete formulation. There 
is consequently less room for maneuver, rendering risk-adverse local officials 
more likely to hew narrowly to the specific contours of central plans.
The direction of judicial reform under Xi also differs in key ways from 
that of the late Hu Jintao era. Centralization, professionalization, and 
separation from local interests are the new watchwords of the day. Nor 
is this limited to the legal system. Similar trends are taking place in the 
party’s internal disciplinary inspection apparatus. Numbers of personnel 
are expanding, and nomination and selection criteria for disciplinary 
inspection heads have been altered to strengthen central control and 
weaken dependence on local party authorities. In addition, central 
disciplinary authorities are in the process of establishing physical offices in 
all central party and government bureaus. This latter measure is part of a 
comprehensive push under Xi to strengthen the disciplinary apparatus—led 
by his ally Wang Qishan—as a tool to purge the party bureaucracy of graft, 
as well as curb the power of Xi’s rivals.
Both the judicial and disciplinary reforms are efforts to develop 
vertically integrated systems to circumvent the power of local officials, 
check the bureaucracy, and address the core principal-agent problem at the 
heart of Chinese governance. None of this is new. Historically, the imperial 
Chinese censorate—officials charged with serving as the eyes and ears of 
the emperor—played precisely this role. Its primary goal was not to provide 
justice in individual cases but to help central leaders ferret out misbehavior 
among the ranks of officialdom. Perhaps something paralleling this kind 
of top-down model of governance—one absent the problematic bottom-up 
pressures unleashed by late twentieth-century reforms—might resemble the 
new direction for legal reform in China.
This is not to say that central judicial officials are intentionally 
attempting to replicate imperial models. To the contrary, recent personnel 
appointments at the Supreme People’s Court have left no doubt that 
liberal-leaning legal technocrats have been given significant sway in 
that institution. Rather, the point is simply that in a broader political 
environment where party officials remain hostile to concepts such as an 
autonomous bar, independent judiciary, and external checks on party 
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power, the components of rule-of-law reforms that are most likely to be 
enacted successfully are the ones that most closely resemble existing party 
practices. Naturally, these measures themselves will in turn have parallels 
with earlier historical models.
The new track of Chinese legal reform leaves open many sets of 
questions. First, will courts be allowed to check other, more powerful 
institutions such as the police? Allowing courts to rearrange their own 
internal bureaucratic structures is one thing. But raising the bureaucratic 
status of judges within the party political-legal apparatus so that they can 
play a meaningful role in helping central officials realize the goal of curbing 
police abuses that lead to wrongful convictions is quite another matter. 
The latter implicates much deeper issues of political organization that have 
stymied reform efforts for the past two decades.
Second, how will these new efforts at legal reform interact with the 
omnipresent pressures for social stability? What happens, for example, 
when a Chinese judge, insulated from local political realities, issues a 
legally correct decision denying hundreds of laid-off workers the right to 
receive back wages, resulting in an angry demonstration in front of the local 
government headquarters? Will the local party secretary be authorized to 
simply ignore the decision? If so, how will protestors react? 
Third, what will the reaction of judges be? Xi’s austerity campaign has 
reduced many of the perks associated with civil service in China, while 
the anticorruption campaign has increased the risks. This shift has led to a 
spreading sense of paralysis within the bureaucracy, as officials are simply 
avoiding tough decisions. Within the courts, new moves to professionalize the 
system by reducing the number of individuals holding the title of judge have 
aroused discontent and contributed to a steady exodus of personnel. Can the 
court system effectively be remodeled without losing institutional cohesion? 
At the 2014 plenum, party leaders clearly signaled their intent to 
rely on the law as a tool to help resolve the pressing problems currently 
facing China. But over the past two decades, Beijing’s insistence on 
holding legal institutions apart from the institutional issues that matter 
has limited their ability to evolve into significant players within the state 
bureaucracy. And regular shifts in the direction of reform have prevented 
these institutions from sinking deep roots into society at large. As a result, 
it is unclear whether Xi’s strategy will work. 
